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NOTES
TRUSTEE LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF THE DUTY
OF LOYALTY: GOOD FAITH INQUIRY AND
APPRECIATION DAMAGES
INTRODUCTION
In remedying breaches of its vaunted duty of loyalty,' the law of
trusts in New York is fettered by rules that emphasize restitutionary
principles. 2 Created by a stubborn adherence to absolute liability,3
this emphasis persists because it was written into the Restatement of
Trusts. 4 Although absolute liability and restitution of gain may still
1. "Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those acting at
arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to
something stricter than the morals of the market place. Not honesty alone, but the
punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this
there has developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising
rigidity has been the attitude of courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the
rule of undivided loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of particular exceptions. Only
thus has the level of conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that
trodden by the crowd. It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this
court." Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928) (Cardozo,
C.J.) (citation omitted). Professor Scott called it "the fiduciary principle." Scott, The
Fiduciary Principle, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 539, 555 (1949).
2. Under restitutionary principles, damages are measured by the defendant's
gain. See Niles, Trustee Accountability in the Absence of Breach of Trust, 60 Colum.
L. Rev. 141, 142 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Trustee Accountability]; Niles, A Con-
temporary View of Liability for Breach of Trust, 29 Rec. A. Bar City N.Y. 573,
579-80, 598 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Contemporary View]; Niles & Schwartz,
Breach of Trust-Recent Developments, 20 N.Y.U. L.Q. 165, 182 (1944); Wellman,
Punitive Surcharges Against Disloyal Fiduciaries-Is Rothko Right?, 77 Mich. L.
Rev. 95, 97-98 (1978); Note, Unjust Enrichment and the Fiduciary's Duty of Loyalty,
84 L.Q. Rev. 472, 472, 478 (1968) (hereinafter cited as Unjust Enrichment]. For an
interesting parallel concerning an unwarranted emphasis of restitutionary principles
in contract law due to the development of quasi-contract (luring the latter part of the
nineteenth century, see Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual Context, 73 Colum. L.
Rev. 1208 (1973).
3. Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (1928); Munson
v. Syracuse, C. & C.R.R., 103 N.Y. 59, 74, 8 N.E. 355, 358 (1886); Haggerty,
Conflicting Interests of Estate Fiduciaries in New York and the "No Further Inquiry"
Rule, 18 Fordham L. Rev. 1, 1-3 (1949).
4. Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959); Restatement of Trusts (1935). The Re-
statement of Trusts is one of several restatements of the law produced by the Amer-
ican Law Institute to analyze "the most important topics of the law and to state
succinctly the rules which are shown by analysis to represent the predominant Amer-
ican authority." Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. Rev. 29, 29 (1938). This ambi-
tious undertaking was believed necessary because "[ilt was apparent that the confu-
sion, the uncertainty, was growing worse from year to year.. . [and] that the vast
multitude of decisions which our practitioners are obliged to consult was reaching a
magnitude which made it impossible in ordinary practice to consult them." American
Law Institute is Organized, 9 A.B.A.J. 137, 137 (1923) (quoting from speech by the
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serve valid purposes,' justice requires an inquiry into the character of
the breach as well as full compensation of the beneficiary when a
trustee makes a sale tainted with a conflict of interest.6
The trustee owes a duty of loyalty to the beneficiary." The self-
dealing trustee 8 who neglects to obtain prior court approval I is irre-
Hon. Elihu Root). To the project were brought the then current legal philosophies
and prejudices. Austin Wakeman Scott was Reporter of the Restatement of Trusts
(1935). He was also co-author of the Restatement of Restitution (1937). The latter
tome covered "a group of situations having distinct unity [that] has never been dealt
with as a unit and because of this has never received adequate treatment." Seavey &
Scott, supra, at 29. These situations involve a person's "'right to have restored to him
a benefit gained at his expense by another, if the retention of the benefit by the
other would be unjust." Id. at 32. The right to restitution when no wrong is commit-
ted filled a void in the law of torts and contracts. Id. at 35-36. Appropriately, it has
found its place in the lav of trusts in the absence of a breach. See Restatement
(Second) of Trusts § 203 (1959); Trustee Accountability, supra note 2, at 144. It has
also been used, however, as the basis for the measure of damages when the duty of
loyalty was breached. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 206, Comment b (1959).
5. In the law of express trusts, restitution is the ordinary remedy in the absence
of a breach of trust. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 203 (1959); Trustee Accounta-
bility, supra note 2, at 141; Contemporary View, supra note 2. at 574-79; Unjust
Enrichment, supra note 2, at 502. Restitution is the primary remedy for gain re-
ceived by a corporate fiduciary when no loss is sustained by the corporation, but the
fiduciary breached his duty of loyalty. For a comprehensive review of this subject,
see Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. Law. 35 (1966). The wrongdoing usually
involves manipulation by insiders of stock in large public corporations and is subject
to some federal regulation. Because it involves a fiduciary relationship, however,
principles and rules developed in the area are applied to trustees. Contemporary
View, supra note 2, at 598-99; cf. People ex. rel. Manice v. Powell, 201 N.Y. 194,
201, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (1911) ("The relation of the directors to the stockholders is
essentially that of trustee and cestui que trust.").
6. Contemporary View, supra note 2, at 599; Niles & Schwartz, supra note 2,
at 189-90.
7. "The trustee is under a duty to the beneficiary to administer the trust solely
in the interest of the beneficiary." Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170 (1959); see
G. Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 543 (rev. 2d ed. 1978); II A. Scott, Law of Trusts §
170 (3d ed. 1967).
8. The self-dealing trustee is one who either purchases trust property for him-
self individually, In re Estate of DePlanche, 65 Misc. 2d 501, 503, 318 N.Y.S.2d
194, 196 (Sur. Ct. 1971), or sells to the trust property he held as an individual.
Smith v. Howlett, 29 A.D. 182, 188-89, 51 N.Y.S. 910, 914-15 (1893).
9. Courts have the power to approve transactions that may be tainted by a
conflict of interest if it would be in the best interests of the beneficiary. In re Scar-
borough Props. Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 553, 558-59, 255 N.E.2d 761, 764, 307 N.Y.S.2d
641, 645 (1969); In re Hubbell, 302 N.Y. 246, 259-60, 97 N.E.2d 88, 894 (1951);
Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 200, 207 (N.Y. 1816); In re Estate of Liss, 102
Misc. 2d 617, 618, 424 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (Sur. Ct. 1980); In re Estate of Rothko, 84
Misc. 2d 830, 841-42, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 938 (Sur. Ct. 1975), modified and affd, 56
A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1977); In re Estate of DePlanche, 65 Misc. 2d 501, 503, 318 N.Y.S.2d 194, 196
(Sur. Ct. 1971); In re Gandy, 14 Misc. 2d 472, 475-76, 166 N.Y.S.2d 529, 532-33
(Sur. Ct. 1957); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170, Comment f (1959); II A. Scott,
supra note 7, § 170.7.
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buttably presumed to be disloyal '0-the no further inquiry rule bars
consideration of good faith and fairness." Such absolute liability is
intended to negate the temptation of self-interest." Because of the
no further inquiry rule, however, honest and dishonest trustees are
subject to the same measures of damages. 3 These measures do not
permit the beneficiary to recover from the trustee appreciation in
property wrongfully sold if the property has been transferred beyond
the point at which the law can compel reconveyance. 4 Thus, the
beneficiary is forced to affirm the transfer that frees the property
from the trust. 5 lIt should be determined, however, whether the
beneficiary's best interests have been served by the transfer. A self-
10. In re Estate of DePlanche, 65 Misc. 2d 501, 501-03, 318 N.Y.S.2d 194, 195-
96 (Sur. Ct. 1971). In Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C.R.R., 103 N.Y. 59, 8 N.E. 355
(1886), the court stated that the fiduciary "stood in the attitude of selling as owner
and purchasing as trustee. The law permits no one to act in such inconsistent rela-
tions. It does not stop to inquire whether the ... transaction was fair or unfair. It
stops the inquiry when the relation is disclosed, and sets aside the transaction or
refuses to enforce it, at the instance of the party whom the fiduciary undertook to
represent, without undertaking to deal with the question of abstract justice in the
particular ease." Id. at 73-74, 8 N.E. at 358; accord, Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 170, Comments b, h (1959); II A. Scott, supra note 7, § 170, at 1298.
11. Munson v. Syracuse, G. & C.R.R., 103 N.Y. 59, 73-74, 8 N.E. 355, 358
(1886); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170, Comments b, h (1959); II A. Scott,
supra note 7, § 170, at 1298.
12. Wardwell v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 651, 658 (1880); see, e.g., Marsh v.
Whitmore, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 178, 183-84 (1874) ("The character of vendor and that
of purchaser cannot be held by the same person. They impose different obligations.
Their union in the same person would at once raise a conflict between interest and
duty, and, constituted as humanity is, in the majority of cases duty would be over-
borne in the struggle."); Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 502, 554-55 (1846)
("[The law] acts not on the possibility, that, in some cases, the sense of ... duty
may prevail over the motives of self-interest, but it provides against the probability
in many cases, and the danger in all cases, that the dictates of self-interest will
exercise a predominant influence, and supercede that of duty."); Stewart v. Lehigh
Valley R.R., 38 N.J.L. 505, 523 (Ct. Err. & App. 1875) ("There may be Isolated
cases in which the trustee is willing to make a contract on more favorable terms for
the cestui que trust than any one else, but the opportunities for self-advancement, at
the expense of those whose concerns he has in charge, and under circumstances
where concealment is easy, are so much more numerous than these isolated cases,
that in declaring a rule the latter are not worthy of consideration."); Bray v. Ford,
[1896] A.C. 44, 51 (Lord Herschell) ("[H]uman nature being what it is, there is
danger... of the person holding a fiduciary position being swayed by interest rather
than by duty."). See generally 1 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence as
Administered in England and America § 322 (13th ed. M. Bigelow 1886).
13. McCord v. Nabours, 101 Tex. 494, 501, 109 S.W. 913, 915-16 (1908); Re-
statement (Second) of Trusts §§ 170, Comment b, 206 (1959); Haggerty, supra note
3, at 2 & n.7.
14. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 206, Comment b (1959).
15. See Note, Appreciation Damages for Self-Purchase by Trustee with Power of
Sale, 25 U. Chi. L. Rev. 389, 392 (1958) (hereinafter cited as Appreciation
Damages].
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dealing honest trustee6 is primarily motivated by the beneficiary's
interest. 17 Thus, affirmance of the sale or recoverv' of the trustee's
profits would adequately remedy the breach.'" A dishonest trustee,
however, is motivated by personal interest.'" Affirmance of his
tainted sale or recovery of his gain would fail to compensate the
beneficiary for all the appreciation of the property that, but for the
wrongful sale, may have accrued to the trust. -O
The trustee who is found to have had such a personal interest in a
sale of trust property to an unrelated third party that his judgment in
making the sale was affected has also breached his duty of loyalty.2'
This breach has been treated as the equivalent of self-dealing.3 Con-
sequently, the rules that were established to define the measure of
damages for this breach are the same as those that apply in self-
dealing cases.? The no further inquiry rule has, however, been sub-
stantially abandoned in the equivalent of self-dealing cases.-" Thus,
the presumption of disloyalty does not arise. Inquiry into the trus-
tee's motives and the fairness of the transaction is necessary to estab-
lish whether personal interest affected his judgment.' Because hon-
est trustees are exonerated by the inquiry, damage rules formulated
16. See Unjust Enrichment, supra note 2, at 478, 501.
17. See In re Estate of Talbot, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 325-26, 296 P.2d 848,
858-59 (1956); Hopkins v. Loeber, 332 I1l. App. 140, 145, 74 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1947).
18. See Unjust Enrichment, supra note 2, at 497, 501-02.
19. See McKim v. Hibbard, 142 Mass. 4229, 426-27, 8 N.E. 152, 155 (1886).
20. Hopkins v. Loeber, 332 111. App. 140, 145, 74 N.E.2d 39, 42 (1947); MeKim
v. Hibbard, 142 Mass. 422, 426-27, 8 N.E. 152, 155 (1886).
21. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 170, Comment c (1959); II A. Scott, supra
note 7, § 170.5, at 1310-11, § 170.10, at 1322-24.
22. In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 84344. 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 940 (Sur.
Ct. 1975), modified and aff'd, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, afftd, 43 N.Y.2d
305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977); Contenporarj View, supra note 2, at
598-99.
23. Restatement (Second) of Trusts, § 206, Comment b (1959).
24. Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 602-03 (2d Cir.) (conflict of
interest was too remote to be inducement), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 929 (1955); Ander-
son v. Bean, 272 Mass. 432, 446-48, 172 N.E. 647, 653-54 (1930) (trustee in a poten-
tial conflict of interest position acted in good faith); Bullivant v. First Nat'l Bank, 246
Mass. 324, 334, 141 N.E. 41, 44-45 (1923) (inquiry revealed trustee's good faith and
honest belief that action taken was advantageous to all concerned and self-interest
was not a motive); Rosencrans v. Fry, 12 N.J. 88. 103-04, 95 A.2d 905, 913 (1953)
(mere existence of potential conflict of interest not determinative; there must be
wrongdoing); Flagg Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 88-89, 73 A.2d 411, 414-15 (1950) (same), see
Haggerty, supra note 3, at 19; Contemporary View, supra note 2, at 573-74, 598-99;
Trustee Accountability, supra note 2, at 156; Niles & Schwartz, supra note 2, at
182-83.
25. Unjust Enrichment, supra note 2, at 501-02. Historically, the extent of the
inquiry was the identity of the third party purchaser and whether he had any relation
to the trustee. Scott, The Trustee's Duty of Loyalty, 49 Harv. L. Rev. 521, 530-33
(1936).
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to apply to both honest and dishonest trustees are inadequate to rem-
edy or to deter bad faith breaches.6
Although the no further inquiry rule may be retained to determine
liability in self-dealing cases,' an inquiry into the conduct of the trus-
tee will assist a court in fashioning appropriate remedies.2" Rules
governing the measure of damages must be reconstructed, therefore,
to account for a distinction between honest and dishonest trustees
and to provide for appreciation damages when necessary to compen-
sate the beneficiary.
26. Wellman, supra note 2, at 105-09; Appreciation Damages, supra note 15, at
393-95.
27. At the minimum, it will force some honest trustees to go to court for ap-
proval of self-dealing transactions, thus removing difficult questions of proof in a later
suit in which a court is asked to ratify the sale. In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d
830, 841-42, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 938 (Sur. Ct. 1975), modified and aff'd, 56 A.D. 2d
499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449
(1977). In addition, the rule will immediately shift the burden of proof of good faith
and fairness to the trustee when a court considers the question of damages. See notes
148-49 infra and accompanying text.
28. Courts of equity have the power to excuse the honest trustee in the absence
of loss to the trust estate, In re Guthrie's Estate, 320 Pa. 530, 538, 182 A. 248, 252,
(1936); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205, Comment g (1959); III A. Scott, supra
note 7, § 205.2, at 1674-75, or, when there is loss, to take good faith conduct into
account in awarding damages. Morse v. Hill, 136 Mass. 60, 71-72 (1883); Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts § 205, Comment d (1959); cf. In re Estate of Talbot, 141
Cal. App. 2d 309, 323-27, 296 P.2d 848, 857-59 (1956) (statutory construction re-
quired consideration of good faith in assessing damages). Only one case, however,
can be found in which the New York Court of Appeals has excused a fiduciary. The
breach involved investment by a guardian in guaranteed mortgage certificates. The
issue was whether the investment fell within the statute prescribing legal invest-
ments for trust funds. The court found that "under the circumstances disclosed, care-
ful fiduciaries and their legal advisers could not reasonably doubt that the language
used by the Legislature in describing investments of trust funds which fiduciaries
might lawfully make was intended to include investments in certificates like those (in
question]." In re Stupack, 274 N.Y. 198, 213, 8 N.E.2d 485, 491 (1937). Three cases
decided soon thereafter, however, indicated that even when good faith and honesty
were present, the court would not inquire into them, and that Stupack represented
the exception. In re Durston's Will, 297 N.Y. 64, 72-73, 74 N.E.2d 310, 313-14
(1947); In re Ryan, 291 N.Y. 376, 386, 52 N.E.2d 909, 912 (1943); City Bank Farm-
ers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 132, 51 N.E.2d 674, 676 (1943). These
decisions led three commentators to call for legislative action. Haggerty, supra note
3, at 28; Niles & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 189-90. Section 19 of The Uniform
Trusts Act provides that "[a] court of competent jurisdiction may, for cause shown
and upon notice to the beneficiaries, relieve a trustee from any or all of the duties
and restrictions which would otherwise be placed upon him by this Act, or wholly or
partly excuse a trustee who has acted honestly and reasonably from liability for viola-
tions of the provisions of this Act." Uniform Trusts Act § 19. Three provisions pro-
hibit self-dealing. Id. §§ 4-6. Similarly, § 61 of the English Trustee Act states that if
a trustee has committed a breach of trust "but has acted honestly and reasonably,
and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the
directions of the court in the matter in which he committed such breach, then the
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I. THE INADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT REMEDIES
The Restatement of Trusts ' and Scott on Trusts " are usually cited
as primary authority for the finding of a breach of the duty of loyalty
and the award of damages.3 ' Conflicting propositions by the two au-
thorities, however, cause confusion for courts attempting to fashion a
just award.Y The Restatement remedies for the breach overempha-
court may relieve him either wholly or partly from personal liability for the same."
English Trustee Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c.19, § 61. New York has not adopted
the Uniform Trusts Act, nor implemented any other legislation expressly empower-
ing courts to excuse the honest trustee. In Rothko, the Surrogate said of a third
executor who was found to be merely negligent that his "help as a candid witness,
his verbal protests [against acts of two co-executors found to have divided loyalties],
and absence of self-interest or bad faith motives, while not sufficient to afford him
continuance in office or statutory commissions, might well be the ground for reliev-
ing him of surcharge. But such is not the law until the appellate courts so speak. All
we can find in his favor is a lower measure of damages .... In re Estate of Rothko,
84 Misc. 2d 830, 846, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 942 (Sur. Ct. 1975), modified and aff'd, 56
A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1977). The two appellate courts affirmed the lesser measure of damages and did
not address the question of not surcharging him at all. 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d
870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977). For a listing of
the seven states and one U.S. territory that have enacted the Uniform Trusts Act §
19, see III A. Scott, supra note 7, § 206, at 1675 n.5.
29. Restatement (Second) of Trusts (1959).
30. A. Scott, supra note 7.
31. See, e.g., Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593, 603 (2d Cir.)
(quoting Restatement § 170, Comment c), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 929 (1955); Rollins
v. May, 473 F. Supp. 358, 366 (D.S.C. 1978) (quoting Restatement § 208; quoting
Scott § 208.3), affd per curiam, 603 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1979); Eaves v. Penn, 426 F.
Supp. 830, 838 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (citing Restatement §§ 205, Comment b, 206),
modified and af''d, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978); In re Estate of Talbot, 141 Cal.
App. 2d 309, 325-26, 296 P.2d 848, 858-59 (1956) (quoting Restatement §§ 205, 208
and Comments thereto; citing § 206); Flagg Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 87, 73 A.2d 411, 414
(1950) (citing Restatement § 170(1)). In Rothko, all three New York courts quoted
Scott § 208.3 and discussed its application. Jn re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830,
873, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 965-66 (Sur. Ct. 1975), modified and aff'd, 56 A.D.2d 499,
504, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, 874, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 320-21, 372 N.E.2d 291, 295-96,
401 N.Y.S.2d 449, 455 (1977). Scott, who was Reporter of the Restatement, was
preeminent in the field of trust law. Arnold, The Restatement of the Law of Trusts,
31 Colum. L. Rev. 800, 801, 823 (1931); Niles & Schwartz, supra note 2, at 170; cf.
Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 135 F. Supp. 176, 190 (D. Del. 1955) (citing to the
distinguished character of Scott as author of the Restatement of Restitution). modified
and affd, 235 F.2d 369 (3d Cir. 1956). One article has noted that an unsupported
proposition by Scott has been used by courts as authority for their decisions. Niles &
Schwartz, supra note 2, at 170. A New York court has now relied on an unsupported
statement by Scott in an award of damages for the breach of the duty of loyalty. See
In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sur. Ct. 1975), modified
and aff'd, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291,
401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977); Wellman, supra note 2, at 109; note 67 infra and accom-
panying text.
32. Courts will cite both for a proposition that only one will support, e.g., In re
Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 877, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 969 (Sur. Ct. 1975) (Scott
19811 1017
1018 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49
size restitutionary principles.- Conversely, Scott reasserts the com-
pensatory purpose of awarding damages in the corresponding sections
of his treatise.3 Furthermore, each authority is internally inconsist-
ent regarding the measure of damages.3
A. The General Rules
Compensatory damages are awarded to compensate a loss that is
causally related to a wrong. They are designed to put the injured
party in a position substantially equivalent to that which he would
have occupied had no wrong been committed.6 Although compensa-
tory damages may include measures of a restitutionary nature if such
would more fully compensate the victim, 37 they should not be dis-
placed by restitutionary principles.3 The purpose remains the res-
toration of the status quo ante.
Restitution, on the other hand, does not require a wrong.39 It is
based on the perception that one "has received a benefit, the reten-
on Trusts § 206 and Restatement § 206 cited to support an award of appreciation
damages when Comment b to Restatement 206 does not), modified and aff'd, 56
A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d
449 (1977), offer interpretations that are inconsistent with the express language, e.g.,
In re Estate of Talbot, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 325-26. 296 P.2d 848, 858-59 (1956)
(stating Restatement § 206 allows recovery of lost profits when the duty of loyalty is
breached, although § 206, Comment b limits recovery to trustee's gain), or cite the
black letter of the Restatement without consulting the comments, which clearly Indi-
cate such application of the section would be inappropriate. E.g. Rollins v. May, 473
F. Supp. 358, 366 (D.S.C. 1978) (Restatement § 208 quoted to support award of
appreciation damages when trustee had power to sell, although Comment b to § 208,
not cited, states that the section is only applicable when there is no power to sell at
any time, to any one, at any price), aff'd per curiam, 603 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1979);
see In re Estate of Talbot, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 325-26, 296 P.2d 848, 858-59 (1956)
(Restatement unclear as to appropriate measure of damages for breach of trust). See
also Wellman, supra note 2, at 103-09; Appreciation Damages, supra note 15, at 389
n.3.
33. See Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 206, Comment b (1959); see note 4
supra and accompanying text; notes 58-66 infra and accompanying text.
34. See II A. Scott, supra note 7, § 170.2 (3d ed. 1967 & 1980 Supp.); III id.,
supra note 7, § 206; note 67 infra and accompanying text.
35. Wellman, supra note 2, at 103-04 & n.30; Appreciation Damages, supra note
15, at 389 n.3.
36. Thrift Shop, Inc. v. Alaska Mut. Say. Bank, 398 P.2d 657, 661 (Alaska 1965);
Peterson v. Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 76 Ill. 2d 353, 363, 392 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1959);
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903, Comment a (1977); C. McCormick, Handbook
on the Law of Damages § 137 (1935); Seavey & Scott, supra note 4, at 31-32.
37. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903 & Comment b (1977); Seavey & Scott,
supra note 4, at 35, 37-38.
38. See Perillo, supra note 2, at 1219-26.
39. Simonds v. Simonds, 45 N.Y.2d 233, 242, 380 N.E.2d 189, 194, 408
N.Y.S.2d 359, 364 (1978); Lengel v. Lengel, 86 Misc. 2d 460, 465, 382 N.Y.S.2d
678, 681-82 (1976); Richards v. Richards, 58 Wis. 2d 290, 297-98, 206 N.W.2d 134,
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tion of which would be unjust. '" '  The finding that enrichment is
unjust ordinarily implies that someone has sustained a loss." When
the loss and benefit are coextensive, restitution fully compensates the
plaintiff."2  The loss and benefit need not, however, be equal."3 If
the recipient has committed no wrong in the acquisition of property,
the measure of damages will be the value of his enrichment." If the
recipient is at fault in the acquisition, however, the measure will be
the loss suffered by the injured party, or the value of the enrichment,
whichever is greater. 43  Therefore, when a wrong has been
committed," restitution is only a device for achieving the goal of com-
pensation. If the loss exceeds the enrichment, the proper focus is the
restoration of the status quo ante.47
Section 205 of the Restatement sets forth the general rule gov-
erning the liability for breach of trust.4' The beneficiary may charge
the trustee with any loss resulting from a breach,' compel payment
137-38 (1973); Restatement of Restitution, Introductory Note to ch. 7, at 529 (1937);
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 203 (1959). Section 203 of the Restatement of
Trusts provides for a purely restitutionary recovery of profits made by the trustee in
absence of a breach of trust. It applies when the trustee did not intend to make a
profit or did not know or have reason to know that he had made a profit. Id. The
principle underlying the remedy, however, is the same as that underlying the duty
of loyalty: that danger lurks whenever the trustee may realize a personal benefit from
the existence of the trust. The section is rarely applied because courts usually assume
a breach when profits have been realized. Trustee Accountability. supra note 2. at
142.
40. Sharp v. Kosmalski, 40 N.Y.2d 119, 123, 351 N.E.2d 721, 724, 386 N.Y.S.2d
72, 76 (1976); see McGrath v. Hilding, 41 N.Y.2d 625, 629, 363 N.E.2d 328, 331.
394 N.Y.S.2d 603, 606 (1977); Restatement of Restitution § 1, Comment a (1937).
41. Restatement of Restitution, Introductory Note to ch. 7, at 522 (1937); id. §
160, Comment d. In some instances, restitution will be required although no loss
was sustained. Saunders v. Kline, 55 A.D.2d 887, 888 (1977) (citing Restatement of
Restitution § 1, Comment e); see Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 203 (1959).
42. Saff v. Safl, 61 A.D.2d 452, 464, 402 N.Y.S.2d 690, 698 (1978) (Cardamone,
J., dissenting); Restatement of Restitution § 1, Comment d (1937).
43. Restatement of Restitution § 1, Comments a, e (1937).
44. Cohen v. City Co. of N.Y., 283 N.Y. 112, 117, 27 N.E.2d 803, 805 (1946);
Restatement of Restitution § 1, Comment e (1937); see Seavey & Scott, supra note 4,
at 31-32.
45. Buffum v. Peter Barceloux Co., 289 U.S. 227, 236-37 (1933); Oliver v. Piatt,
44 U.S. 332, 400, 3 How. 333, 401 (1845); Restatement of Restitution § 1, Comment
c (1937); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 903, Comment b (1977).
46. See Perillo, supra note 2, at 1219-26; Seavey & Scott, supra note 4, at 35,
37.
47. Restatement of Restitution § 1, Comment e (1937); Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 903, Comment b (1977); Perillo, supra note 2, at 1219-26.
48. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205 (1959). "A breach of trust is a violation
by the trustee of any duty which as trustee he owes to the beneficiary." Id. § 201
(emphasis added). The breach arises when the trustee is personally at fault or per-
forms acts under a mistake of law or fact. Id. § 201, Comments a, b. c.
49. Id. § 205. If the trustee with a power of sale sells trust property for less than
fair value, he is chargeable with the difference between the proceeds and the fair
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into the trust of any benefit received by him through a breach, 7 and
in some instances, hold the trustee liable for any profits that would
have accrued but for the breach.-" The beneficiary has the choice of
the remedy to pursue.5 2 If he is under a disability, the court will
pursue the remedy "most advantageous to him and most conducive to
effectuating the purposes of the trust."" The rule is clearly
compensatory.' Its purpose is to remedy an injury causally related
to fault.-
B. Breaches of the Duty of Loyalty
Section 206 applies the general rule of section 205 to the breach of
the duty of loyalty." Presumably, the compensatory purpose of see-
value at the time of sale. He is not chargeable with appreciation subsequent to the
sale. The only breach involved is the sale for less than value. Such a sale is not
voidable because it merely evidences poor judgment on the part of the trustee as to
the true value of the property. The trust is made whole by payment to it of the
balance of the value on the date of sale. Id. § 205, Comment d.
50. Id. § 205. This clause finds its broadest application when the duty of loyalty
is breached. See id. § 206; cf. id. § 203 (restitution of profit in the absence of i
breach of trust).
51. Id. § 205. Comment i to § 205 provides that the trustee is chargeable with
such loss when he sells property that he has a duty to retain, fails to purchase
property that he has a duty to purchase, or fails to make trust property productive.
Id. § 205, Comment i. These three situations are specifically addressed in §§ 208,
211, and 207 respectively. It is unclear whether the specificity of § 205, Comment i
limits the availability of the lost profits remedy to these three breaches. Scott
appears to support the proposition that the listing is not exclusive. In his own trea-
tise, he uses an example of a self-dealing trustee with a power of sale to explain the
remedy. III A. Scott, supra note 7, § 205, at 1667-68. But see Wellman, supra note
2, at 105.
52. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205, Comment a (1959). The options are
measures that allow for the differing facts and circumstances of specific breaches. The
"remedies are not always distinct and are not always all of them available." Id.
53. Id. § 205, Comment b (1959); accord, Eaves v. Penn, 426 F. Supp. 830, 838
(W.D. Okla. 1976), modified, and aff'd, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir. 1978). Similarly, the
court will choose the appropriate remedy when several beneficiaries cannot agree, or
when one or more of them is under an incapacity. Morse v. Hill, 136 Mass. 60,
70-71 (1883); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 214, Comment d (1959). Included in
the factors to be considered are the "relative pecuniary advantages to the trust
estate." Id.
54. Eaves v. Penn, 426 F. Supp. 830, 838 (W.D. Okla. 1976) (citing § 205,
Comment b), modified and aff'd, 587 F.2d 453 (10th Cir, 1978); In re Estate of
Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 322, 372 N.E.2d 291, 298, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449, 456 (1977)
(award of appreciation damages intended to make beneficiaries whole); In re Estate
of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 872, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 965 (Sur. Ct. 1975) (citing §
205), modified and aff'd, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305,
372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977); see 2 J. Story, supra note 12, §§ 1277-
1278.
55. See notes 36-38 supra and accompanying text.
56. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 206 (1959).
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tion 205 would be fundamental to the section 206 remedies.Y Com-
ment b to section 206, however, emphasizes restitutionary principles
because it only expressly allows the beneficiary to recover any profit
realized by the trustee. n
1. Self-Dealing
When the self-dealing trustee continues to hold the trust property,
the beneficiary can compel reconveyance to the trust, or force a sale
by the trustee and recover the proceeds.0 If the trustee has resold
the trust property to a third party, however, the beneficiary is only
authorized by the Restatement to compel the trustee to account for
the profit.' It is incongruous that the breaching trustee may thus fix
his liability because he will be subject to none of the constraints,
considerations, and duties of trust when making the second sale.!"
57. Id. § 206, Comment a.
58. Comment b, entitled "Sale of trust property to the trustee individually," pro-
vides that if "the trustee in breach of trust sells trust property to himself individu-
ally, and the price paid by him was less than the value of the property at the time
when the trustee purchased it, the beneficiary can compel him to pay the difference;
or, at his option, the beneficiary can set aside the sale and compel the trustee to
reconvey the property and account for any income which he has received
therefrom ... ; or he can compel the trustee to offer the property for sale and if it is
sold for more than the amount which the trustee paid for it, compel him to account
for the excess. If the trustee has resold the property at a profit, the beneficiary can
compel him to account for the profit. Similarly, the trustee is liable where lie does
not purchase the property individually, but has such an interest in the purchase that
he violates his duty of loyalty in making the sale." Id. § 206, Comment b. Thus, in
each case the trustee is only charged with the profit he retained or made on the
transaction. See Appreciation Damages, supra note 15, at 392.
59. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 206, Comment b (1959). It is well settled
that the sale is voidable if the trustee breaches his duty of loyalty by purchasing trust
property for himself individually. Michoud v. Girod, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 502, 552
(1846); City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 132, 51 N.E.2d 674,
676 (1943); Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 200, 214 (N.Y. 1816); In re Estate of
Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 858, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 952 (Sur. Ct. 1975), modified and
affd, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977); Fox v. Mackreth, 29 Eng. Rep. 224, 234-38 (1788); see II A.
Scott, supra note 7, §§ 170.1, 170.2. One commentator has suggested that recon-
veyance is included as an option because as long as the trustee holds the property
individually there is the potential to realize more profit. Appreciation Damages, su-
pra note 15, at 392.
60. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 206, Comment b (1959). If the third party
purchaser has notice of the breach, however, the beneficiary has various remedies
against him. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 291 (1959); see notes 75-79 infra and
accompanying text.
61. E.g., Fox v. Mackreth, 29 Eng. Rep. 224, 236-37 (1788); cf. Appreciation
Damages, supra note 15, at 392 (beneficiary forced to affirm second sale, but no
reason to distinguish such sale from a sale by the trustee directly to a third party).
See also note 147 infra and accompanying text.
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The beneficiary may have suffered a loss in excess of the profits rea-
lized by the trustee 62 because, but for the breach, the property may
never have been sold, and all appreciation to the time of the suit
would have accrued to the benefit of the trust.' Because the pri-
mary purpose of awarding damages for breach of trust is to compen-
sate the beneficiary,r4 the resale" should not be conclusive as to the
62. In In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sur. Ct.
1975), modified and aff'd, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305,
372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977), the Surrogate stated that, if "in the area
of trusts and estates the sole purpose of damages is to make the beneficiary whole, it
would seem that when a fiduciary is authorized to sell and he sells to himself or to
another with whom he is closely associated, the actual injury to the beneficiary is the
difference, if any, between the price paid and the price which could have been
obtained on the market." Id. at 876, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 968-69. This is not.an accurate
assessment of the injury that may be caused by a sale because it fails to ascertain
whether the sale was justified. Appreciation Damages, supra note 15, at 392; see
notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
63. See McKim v. Hibbard, 142 Mass. 422, 426-27, 8 N.E. 152, 154-55 (1886). In
McKim, the court noted that "[i]f the trustee had sold the securities for the honest
purpose of reinvesting the proceeds, and subsequently, yielding to temptation, had
misappropriated the funds," id. at 426, 8 N.E. at 154, an award of damages equal to
the proceeds plus interest to the date of the suit might be appropriate. Id., 8 N.E.
at 154. It found, however, that the sales "were not a part of an honest transaction,
by which an investment of the trust estate was to be changed, but of a transaction by
means of which the funds were to be misappropriated." Id. at 426-27, 8 N.E. at 155.
The sale itself was called into question. Its timing and the amount received from it
were not considerations made with the beneficiary's best interests in mind, but were
based on the trustee's personal interests. The fact of the sale was, therefore,
irrelevant. Id., 8 N.E. at 155.
64. See note 54 supra.
65. The importance given to the resale by the Restatement may result from the
use in equity of the constructive trust as a device to fashion the remetdy. See Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts §§ 202, 206, Comment b, 291 (1959). See generally Restate-
ment of Restitution §§ 160, 198, 202 (1937); 3 J. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction §§
1044, 1045, 1052 (4th ed. 1918). "The specific instances in which equity impresses a
constructive trust are numberless,-as numberless as the modes by which property
may be obtained, through bad faith and unconscientious acts." Id. § 1044, at 2373-
74. Courts of equity "have adopted principles exceedingly broad and comprehensive
in the application of their remedial justice .... This is often done by converting the
offending party into a trustee and making the property itself subservient to the
proper purposes of recompense by way of equitable trust .. ." 2 J. Story, supra
note 12, § 1265, at 610-11; see G. Bogert, supra note 7, § 471, at 3-8. Justice
Cardozo described a constructive trust as "the formula through which the conscience
of equity finds expression." Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 225 N.Y. 380,
386, 122 N.E. 378, 380 (1919). A constructive trust is a restitutionary device direct-
ing reconveyance in specie. Note, Constructive Trusts Based Upon the Breach of an
Express Oral Trust of Land, 20 Harv. L. Rev. 549, 552 (1907); see Restatement of
Restitution § 202, Comment c (1937). It must, therefore, attach to property, the legal
title of which is in the person who is unjustly enriched. Id., Introductory Note to ch.
13, at 817; id. § 160, Comments i, j; cf. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 74 (1959)
(necessity of trust property for creation of a trust). Upon resale to a bona fide pur-
chaser for adequate consideration, the property is freed from trust. Restatement of
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value from which damages are to be measured.' Forcing the benefi-
ciary to affirm the resale defeats the compensatory purpose of the
general rule.
In his treatise, Scott does not limit the beneficiary to a restitution-
ary recovery. In an explanation of the remedies available for breaches
of the duty of loyalty, he states that
[i]f the trustee sells trust property to himself individually, and sub-
sequently resells the property to a third person, the beneficiaries
have the option of charging him with the value of the property at
the time of the sale with interest, or with the value of the property
at the time of the suit, or they can hold him accountable for the
proceeds.6
Permitting the beneficiary to recover appreciation subsequent to the
resale acknowledges the necessity of distinguishing the self-dealing
trustee's resale from a bona fide sale from the trust directly to a third
party.
2. Equivalent of Self-Dealing
Comment b to section 206 makes the trustee whose sale directly to
a third party is motivated by his personal interest" liable for the
same damages as the self-dealing trustee."' If the third party pur-
chaser was without notice of the trustee's breach, "° the beneficiary
may only recover from the trustee the balance of fair value on the
Restitution § 172, 201, Comment a (1937); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 284,
287 (1959); 3 J. Pomeroy, supra, § 1058, at 2420-21; 2 J. Story, supra note 12, §
1264. The beneficiary is consequently limited to a damage recovery from the trans-
feror. See Restatement of Restitution § 172, Comment a (1937); Restatement
(Second) of Trusts §§ 206, Comment b, 284, 295 (1959); 3 J. Pomeroy, supra, § 1058,
at 2420-21, § 1080, at 2481.
66. When the trustee retains the property, restitution is compensatory and is
achieved by means of a constructive trust. The constructive trust, however, is em-
ployed only "as a device to make the beneficiary or principal whole." G. Bogert,
supra note 7, § 481, at 275 (emphasis added). Its loss as a device to achieve restitu-
tion in specie should not be determinative of the measure of damages.
67. III A. Scott, supra note 7, § 206, at 1675-76 (emphasis added). Until the
decision by the New York Court of Appeals in In re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d
305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977), no cases were cited by Scott in
support of the proposition that the beneficiary may charge the trustee with apprecia-
tion subsequent to the resale. In new text added after the decision, Scott emphasized
the compensatory nature of the remedy, extolling the "flexible principles of equity."
III A. Scott, supra note 7, § 206 (Supp. 1980). Scott had entirely omitted the appre-
ciation damage option from his more detailed section on remedies available to the
beneficiaries for breaches of the duty of loyalty, II id. § 170.2 (3d ed. 1967), but
corrected this omission in new text. II Id. § 170.2 (Supp. 1980).
68. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170, Comment c (1959).
69. Id. § 206, Comment b; see note 56 supra.
70. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 284 (1959). "A person has notice of a breach
of trust if ... he knows or should know of the breach of trust .... Id. § 297.
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date of sale, if the price had been inadequate," or the value of the
benefit obtained by the trustee. 2 These remedies, however, will fail
to compensate the beneficiary when the trustee's interest was the
decisive factor in whether the sale would be made.73 As in the case
of the self-dealing trustee's resale, the beneficiary should not be
forced to affirm such a sale. 74
Curiously, the beneficiary is not limited by the Restatement to a
recovery based solely on restitutionary principles when the trustee
has sold with a view to personal gain directly to a third party who has
notice of the breach. 7 The beneficiary may compel reconveyance of
the property if it is still held by the third party.76 If the third party
with notice has resold in a bona-fide transaction, however, the bene-
ficiary may compel payment into the trust of either the profits rea-
lized on the resale 7 or the value at the time of the suit,-" whichever
is greater.'9 The rationale for this rule is that because the resale has
precluded recovery of the property, the third party with notice must
pay its value. 0 The award correctly emphasizes restoration of the
beneficiary to the status quo ante and penalizes the wrongdoer.2 The
trustee remains liable, however, only for his profit or the fair value
on the date of sale.82 The inequity of permitting the self-dealing trus-
tee to fix the beneficiary's' recovery by resale, or of only charging the
equivalent of self-dealing trustee with the value as of the sale date or
the value of his personal gain, is magnified when these remedies are
compared with the rationale underlying the liability of the third party
71. Id. § 206, Comments b, d.
72. Id. § 206, Comment d.
73. See pt. II(C) infra.
74. When the sale would have been made on or about the same time regardless
of the conflicting interest, it is not unfair that the beneficiary must affirm it for the
remedies are adequate. See notes 71-72 supra and accompanying text.
75. Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718, 742-44 (D.
Colo. 1967); Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 291 (1959).
76. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 291 (1959). The purchaser holds the prop-
erty as a constructive trustee. Id. § 288.
77. Id. § 291, Comment d; see United States v. Dunn, 268 U.S. 121, 133 (1925).
78. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 291, Comment g (1959).
79. The beneficiary has the choice of remedies, Id. § 291, Comment 1.
80. Id. § 291, Comment g.
81. The third party purchaser with notice from a self-dealing trustee should be
similarly liable. The trustee's purchase, without court approval or the beneficiary's
effective consent, is voidable, and a constructive trust attaches to the property. This
trust is not extinguished because under the rationale of Restatement § 288 and § 284,
a third party purchaser for value with notice of the breach is not a bona fide pur-
chaser. The Restatement does not, however, directly address this situation. Neither
does Scott. If the third party were not so liable and the trustee were chargeable only
with the profit realized by him on the resale, collusion would be rewarded, Appre-
ciation Damages, supra note 15, at 395 & n.32. Moreover, courts would be power-
less to make the beneficiary whole.
82. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 206, Comment b (1959).
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purchaser with notice.8 3  Comment b to section 206 should be
amended to allow the beneficiary the option to recover from the dis-
honest trustee the monetary equivalent of reconveyance when the
property has been transferred beyond the trust.
II. APPRECIATION DAMAGES
The problem with the section 206 remedies arises from the reliance
on the no further inquiry rule to deter both honest and dishonest
trustees from breaches of the duty of loyalty.8 The policy im-
plemented by the no further inquiry rule is based on two assump-
tions. First, absolute liability is the most effective deterrent of
disloyalty." Second, equity is made more efficient because proof of
fraud is elusive at best." Even if the first assumption is correct, it
does not follow that a distinction cannot or should not be made be-
tween honest and dishonest trustees when damages are assessed.8Y
Nor is the same amount of deterrence needed for each." Moreover,
it should not be presumed that the conduct of an honest trustee will
have damaged a trust estate to the same extent as the conduct of the
dishonest trustee." The judicial efficiency achieved by a refusal to
83. In re Estate of Rothko, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 322, 372 N.E.2d 291, 298, 401
N.Y.S.2d 449, 456 (1977). One commentator has noted this inconsistency, but sug-
gests that, because the trustee is not liable for appreciation damages unless he was
under a § 208 duty to retain, the third party should only be similarly liable when he
purchases trust property with notice of the duty to retain. Wellman, supra note 2, at
107-08. Section 291 makes no such qualification and speaks only of notice of the
"breach of trust." Because "breach of trust" is defined as a violation of "any" duty in
§ 201, narrowing the application of § 291 to breaches of the duty to retain is un-
reasonable. Although the third party's potential liability under § 291 is inconsistent
with the lesser liability of the trustee with the power of sale under Comment b to §
206, the inconsistency should be resolved in favor of the compensatory goal of mak-
ing the beneficiary whole by charging the trustee with the greater measure of dam-
ages in appropriate cases. See In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 879, 379
N.Y.S.2d 923, 971 (Sur. Ct. 1975), modified and affd, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d
870, aftd, 43 N.Y. 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977).
84. See In re Will of Ryan, 291 N.Y. 376, 405-07, 52 N.E.2d 909, 922 (1943);
Haggerty, supra note 3, at 1-2; Contemporary View, supra note 2, at 580.
85. In re Will of Ryan, 291 N.Y. 376, 405-07, 52 N.E.2d 909, 922-23 (1943); City
Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 132, 51 N.E.2d 674, 676 (1943);
Keech v. Sandford, 25 Eng. Rep. 223, 223 (1726); Haggerty, supra note 3, at 1-2;
Contemporary View, supra note 2, at 580 (as to self-dealing only).
86. Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 38 N.J.L. 505, 523 (Ct. Err. & App. 1875);
accord, 1 J. Story, supra note 12, § 322; Wellman, supra note 2, at 98.
87. Appreciation Damages, supra note 15, at 393-95; see Trustee Accountability,
supra note 2, at 142-43; Unjust Enrichment, supra note 2, at 475-78.
88. In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 876-77, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 969 (Sur.
Ct. 1975), modified and aff'd, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aft'd, 43 N.Y.2d
305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977); Trustee Accountability, supra note 2,
at 142-43; Appreciation Damages, supra note 15, at 394-95.
89. See pt. H(C) infra; cf. Hopkins v. Loeber, 332 I11. App. 140, 145, 74 N.E.2d
39, 42 (1947) (dishonest trustee liable for greater damages than honest trustees); In re
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establish culpability is at the expense of the honest trustee and the
beneficiary.
The diligent trustee will avoid tainted transactions or go to court
for approval. 9° Some honest trustees, however, may negligently en-
gage in self-dealing or its equivalent without court approval.9' The
dishonest trustee, having weighed the potential reward against the
risk of discovery and its consequent liability, may take the chance and
cover his tracks to improve the odds.' Different principles should
be applied to the latter two." Limiting a trustee's liability to fair
value on the date of sale or restitution of profit treats the honest
trustee fairly because his liability is neither open ended nor greater
than the gain that he has realized. 94 The current rules, however,
similarly limit the dishonest trustee's liability. A dishonest trustee
will not long consider the interests of the beneficiary if he stands to
lose only the gain he intends to make.9 Remedial rules that single
him out to account for all loss resulting from a fraudulent sale, includ-
ing appreciation in property that would have accrued to the trust but
for his self-interest, will give him more reason to pause and will en-
sure that the beneficiary is restored to the status quo."
A. The Duty to Retain
In contrast to Comment b to section 206, section 208 allows the
beneficiary the option of charging the trustee with appreciation dam-
ages when he sells property in violation of a duty to retain.' The
rationale is that but for the wrongful sale, the property would have
Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 879, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 971 (Sur. Ct. 1975)
(negligent executor liable for lesser damages than dishonest executors), modifed and
aff'd, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977).
90. See note 9 supra.
91. Phipps v. Boardman, (1965] 1 All E.R. 849, 857; Haggerty, supra note 3, at
2-3.
92. See McKim v. Hibbard, 142 Mass. 422, 427, 8 N.E. 152, 155 (1886); Davouc
v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 200, 209 (N.Y. 1816); Fox v. Mackreth, 29 Eng. Rep. 224,
226-27 (1788).
93. In re Estate of Talbot, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 323-27, 296 P.2d 848, 856-57
(1956); Unjust Enrichment, supra note 2, at 475; Appreciation Damages, supra note
15, at 393-95.
94. Trustee Accountability, supra note 2, at 142; Wellman, supra note 2, at 98;
Unjust Enrichment, supra note 2, at 502.
95. Trustee Accountability, supra note 2, at 142; Appreciation Damages, supra
note 15, at 394-95.
96. In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 877, 379 N.Y.S. 2d 923, 969 (Sur.
Ct. 1975), modified and aff'd, 56 A.D. 2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d
305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977).
97. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 205, Comment i (1959); id. § 208, Com-
ment d (1959).
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remained in trust.' Because the beneficiary has such a protectable
expectation, the only way to make him whole is to allow recover), of
the value of the property at the time of the suit, even though the
property is beyond the reach of a constructive trust or lien.9
The limitation of Comment b to section 206 and the allowance by
the Restatement of appreciation damages against the trustee only
when there is a duty to retain have spawned the fiction that improper
exercise of a power of sale creates a duty to retain."°  The power of
sale,'' however, is a privilege,' - subject to standards of proper exer-
cise embodied in the prudent man rule.In If these standards are not
98. See III A. Scott, supra note 7, § 208.3, at 1686.
99. Hart v. Ten Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 53, 93 (N.Y. 1816).
100. In Rollins v. May, 473 F. Supp. 358 (D.S.C. 1978), affd per curiam, 603
F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1979), the court quoted Restatement § 208 and Scott § 208.3 and
measured the damages assessed against a trustee who had the power to sell by the
value at the time of the suit of the property that had been sold. Id. at 366-67. In III
re Estate of Talbot, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 296 P.2d 848 (1956). the court called the
fiction a "play on words." Id. at 326, 296 P.2d at 859; see II re Estate of Rothko, 43
N.Y.2d 305, 321, 372 N.E.2d 291, 297-98, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449. 456 (1977); Apprecia-
tion Damages, supra note 15, at 391-92.
101. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 190 (1959). The trustee has the power of
sale if he is specifically authorized to sell trust property by the instrument creating
the trust or if the "sale is necessary or appropriate to enable the trustee to carry out
the purposes of the trust." Id. If the sale of specific property is expressly forbidden
by the terms of the trust or if "it appears from the terms of the trust that the
property was to be retained in specie," id., the necessity or propriety of sale must be
passed upon by the court prior to the sale. Id. § 190, Comment f. The intent of the
settlor is controlling, id. § 190, Comment a, and the purposes of the trust and the
nature of the property are relevant factors in considering whether the trustee has a
power of sale. Id. § 190, Comments c, d,
102. Id., Introductory Note to Topic 3, at 398.
103. King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 85-86 (1869). "[Ihe trustee is bound to employ
such diligence and such prudence in the care and management, as in general, pru-
dent men of discretion and intelligence in such matters, employ in their own like
affairs." Id.; accord, In re Clark, 257 N.Y. 132, 136 (1931); McCabe v. Fowler, 84
N.Y. 314, 318 (1881); Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 174, 190, Comment i, 227
(1959). A mere error in judgment will not expose the trustee to liability. Stark v.
United States Trust Co., 445 F. Supp. 670, 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (applying New York
law). The same rule applies to executors. In re Estate of Scheuer, 94 Misc. 2d 538,
543, 405 N.Y.S.2d 189, 193 (Sur. Ct. 1978). This so-called prudent man rule is dis-
tinct from the duty of loyalty. In re Estate of Heidenreich, 85 Misc. 2d 135, 137-38,
378 N.Y.S.2d 982, 984-85 (Sur. Ct. 1976); see In re Estate of Talbot, 141 Cal. App.
2d 309, 326, 296 P.2d 848, 859 (1956); King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 84-85, 94-95
(1869). When terms such as "uncontrolled," "absolute," "unlimited," and the like are
used to modify discretion, they are generally regarded as indicative of an intention to
authorize the making or retention of investments that would otherwise be prohibited
by the prudent man rule. In re Walter, Jr., N.Y.L.J., July 7. 1980, at 5, col. 1, at 5,
col. 4 (Sup. Ct. June 6, 1980). But cf. In re Will of Durston, 297 N.Y. 64, 72, 74
N.E.2d 310, 313 (1947) (broad investment powers did not sanction retention of stock
that placed trustee in conflict of interest). New York has codified the prudent man
rule. N.Y. Est., Powers & Trusts Law § 11-2.2(a)(1) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
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met with respect to a particular sale,""' a duty to retain is not created.
The trustee had the power to sell and may have properly exercised it
with regard to the same property."
The fiction, equating misuse of the power of sale with the duty to
retain, is clearly inapposite to the duty to retain contemplated by
section 208. Comment b limits application of section 208 to situations
in which "the trustee is under a duty to retain trust property
throughout and has no authority to sell at any price, at any time, or
under any conditions." " The section, therefore, should be relegated
to serve its limited purpose.
Appreciation damages, however, may be the correct remedy for a
breach of trust in the making of a sale even though a section 208 duty
to retain cannot be inferred from either an improper sale or impru-
dent reinvestment of the proceeds. °r Indeed, the precedent used as
the source for section 208 suggests that appreciation damages should
be available. In the third Tentative Draft of the Restatement, several
cases cited to support the predecessor to section 208 involved trus-
tees who had a power of sale."0
104. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 230, Comment e (1959); see note 103 supra.
105. In re Estate of Talbot, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 326, 296 P.2d 848, 859 (1956);
McKim v. Hibbard, 142 Mass. 422, 426, 8 N.E. 152, 154 (1886); Re Walker, 62
L.T.R. (n.s.) 449, 450 (1890); Re Massingberd's Settlement, 63 L.T.R. (n.s.) 296.
296-97 (1890), aff'g, 60 L.T.R. (n.s.) 620 (1889); Phillipson v. Catty, 68 Eng. Rep.
213, 219 (1848); cf. Rollins v. May, 473 F. Supp. 358, 366 (D.S.C. 1978) (using
Restatement § 208 to support award of damages measured as of date of the suit),
aff'd per curiam, 603 F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1979).
106. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 208, Comment b (1959).
107. In Rollins v. May, 473 F. Supp. 358 (D.S.C. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 603
F.2d 487 (4th Cir. 1979), the trustee was empowered to convey real estate held in
the trust as she deemed advisable "'for the purposes only of reinvesting the proceeds
of such sale in other real estate."' Id. at 361 (emphasis added). The trustee, how-
ever, sold some of the real estate and gave the proceeds to the income beneficiary.
Id. at 361-62. Considered as a case of misappropriation, therefore, the award of dam-
ages measured by the present value of the sold properties was appropriate because
they were a satisfactory approximation of the present value of a proper reinvestment
that the trustee was required to make. Id. at 366. The court cited § 208, id., but the
trustee did not have a duty to retain the specific property, as defined by Comment
b, nor did such a duty arise from the fact of misappropriation.
108. In four of the five cases cited in the Explanatory Notes to the predecessor to
§ 208, Restatement of Trusts, Explanatory Notes § 199, Comment d, at 157 (Tent.
Draft No. 3, 1932), the trustee had a power of sale. In Phillipson v. Catty, 68 Eng.
Rep. 213 (1848), the Vice-Chancellor held that an unlawful reinvestment of the pro-
ceeds from an otherwise lawful sale made the sale itself unlawful and required the
trustees to replace the property that was sold. Id. at 214. This, however, was not an
abuse of the dower to sell, but a breach of the investment terms of the trust. Today,
this breach would be remedied by charging the trustee with the loss on the improper
investment. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 205, 227, Comment r (1959). Re Mas-
singberd's Settlement, 63 L.T.R. (n.s.) 296 (1890), and Re Walker, 62 L.T.R. (n.s.)
449 (1890), followed the Phillipson rationale to negate broad powers of sale because
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All beneficiaries have a protectable expectation that trust property
will remain in trust until properly sold in a transaction "necessary or
appropriate to enable the trustee to carry out the purposes of the
of reinvestment of the proceeds from an otherwise valid sale in improper invest-
ments. In each case, damages were measured by the value of the property "improp-
erly" sold as of the time of suit. The change in investments in both these cases was
accompanied by a breach of the duty to keep trust property separate, and it is un-
clear to what extent the courts were influenced in their ultimate decisions by the
additional breach. It may be that the courts in all three English cases were merely
using the value of the sold securities as a measure of damages. Some light is shed on
this by the following passage in an 1869 New York case that dealt solely with sur-
charge for improper investment. "It is conceded, that in England, the rule is, and
has long been settled, that a trustee, holding funds to invest for the benefit of his
cestui que trust, is bound to make such investment in the public debt, for the safety
whereof the faith of their government is pledged; or in loans, for which real estate is
pledged as security. And that, although the terms of the trust commit the invest-
ment, in general terms, to the discretion of the trustee, that discretion is controlled
by the above rule, and is to be exercised within the very narrow limits, which it
prescribes." King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76, 83 (1886); see III A. Scott, supra note 7, §
227.4, at 1813. Determining that no such narrow rule applied in this country, the
court applied a prudent man standard and held the trustee liable for loss on the
imprudent investments. King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. at 8448. The court's approach sug-
gests that the three English cases cited to support a § 208 award of appreciation
damages had nothing to do with a duty to retain. Rather, these cases should be
viewed as dealing with breaches of an investment duty for which damages were
measured by what appropriate investments would have been worth at the time of the
suit. Two American cases were also cited in the Explanatory Notes. Hart v. Ten
Eyck, 2 Johns. Ch. 53 (N.Y. 1816), involved a sale pursuant to a court decree that
had been fraudulently obtained by the fiduciaries. Relying on a rule that allowed
recovery of the value of converted stock as of the date of the decree, the court
measured certain damages by the value of the property at the time of the suit. Id. at
91-95. This reasoning may be questioned because this rule has been abandoned in
favor of the New York rule that the highest intermediate value within a reasonable
period after notice of the conversion may be recovered. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Corp. v. Walston & Co., 22 N.Y.2d 672, 673, 238 N.E.2d 754, 754, 291 N.Y.S.2d
366, 367 (1968); cf. Baker v. Drake, 53 N.Y. 211, 215-18 (1873) (criticizing old rule as
windfall for plaintiff). On the other hand, when the converted asset is unique, the
value at the time of suit may be an appropriate measure. Menzel v. List, 24 N.Y.2d
91, 99, 246 N.E.2d 742, 746, 298 N.Y.S.2d 979, 984 (1969); In re Estate of Rothko,
84 Misc. 2d 830, 879, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 971 (Sur. Ct. 1975), modified and affrd, 56
A.D.2d 499, 503, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, 874, afftd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401
N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977). In any event, because the decree allowing the sale was
fraudulently obtained, a duty to retain could be imputed, and the case may be
proper support for § 208. In the fifth case cited, McKim v. Hibbard, 142 Mass. 422,
8 N.E. 152 (1886), however, the trustee had broad powers to sell and reinvest, but
sold the securities to use the proceeds for his own purposes. The trustee concealed
the sales and pretended to receive dividends on the investments after the sales, thus
raising the presumption that he would have held the securities through the date of
the suit. Accordingly, the award of the value of the securities as of the time of the
suit was proper. Id. at 430-31, 8 N.E. at 157. The trustee, however, had no obliga-
tion to retain specific securities and could have disposed of them in a proper sale. id.
at 423-29, 8 N.E. at 153.
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trust." 109 To stress, therefore, that the section 208 allowance of
appreciation damages is based on the beneficiary's expectation when
the trustee has no power of sale" 0 is to miss the point. The signifi-
cance of the section 208 duty to retain is that it removes all difficul-
ties of proof as to whether the property wrongfully sold would have
been retained but for the breach until the date of the suit. Admit-
tedly, it is difficult to establish whether the trustee with a power of
sale would have made the sale but for the conflict of interest."' That
difficulties of proof exist, however, is no reason to deny the benefici-
ary adequate compensation. The protectable expectation of any ben-
eficiary to sales made in his best interest confronted the New York
courts in In re Estate of Rothko."2
B. In re Estate of Rothko
Surrogate Midonick,"3 in Rothko, found that two of the three
executors "' of the will of Mark Rothko I" had breached the duty of
loyalty in entering into two agreements "I with Marlborough
galleries I" for the sale of 100 of decedent's paintings and the consign-
109. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 190 (1959); see McKim v. Hibbard, 142
Mass. 422, 426-27, 8 N.E. 152, 154-55 (1886); Wellman, supra note 2, at 112.
110. The trustee has legal title to trust property. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §
2, Comments d, f (1959). The beneficiary has an equitable interest. Id. "The ben-
eficiary is not entitled to possession or control of the subject matter of the trust
except as provided by the terms of the trust." Id. § 175, Comment a. Imposing a
duty to retain on the trustee does not, therefore, entitle the beneficiary to any valu-
able interest absent some other duty imposed by the terms of the trust. Id.; II A.
Scott, supra note 7, § 175, at 1418. Although the trustee is under a duty to retain,
the beneficiary has only an enforceable expectation that the property will remain in
trust. See Wellman, supra note 2, at 112. Any beneficiary however, has this "legiti-
mate claim to ... the value of the trustee's proper performance." Id.
111. Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649, 656-58, modified and aff'd, 169 F.2d 148 (2d
Cir. 1948); Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1946).
112. 84 Misc. 2d 830, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923 (Sur. Ct. 1975), modified and aff'd, 56
A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.
2d 449 (1977).
113. The Surrogate's opinion is a most comprehensive handling of issues raised
during the 89 days at trial. Counsel for seven parties generated approximately 3,000
pages of briefs and 5,000 pages of pretrial depositions. The transcript of the trial was
15,000 pages. 43 N.Y.2d at 315, 372 N.E.2d at 294, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 452; 84 Misc.
2d at 868, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 961.
114. The third executor, Morton Levine, did not operate under a conflict of in-
terest, but was found to have known of the conflicts of the other two and to have
been negligent in not preventing the wrongful conduct. 84 Misc. 2d at 845-47, 857,
379 N.Y.S.2d at 941-42.
115. Rothko was a leading expressionist painter who died on February 25, 1970.
Id. at 834, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
116. The agreements were consumated on May 21, 1970. Id. 379 N.Y.S.2d at 932.
117. One agreement was made with Marlborough Gallery, Inc., a New York cor-
poration, the other with Marlborough A.G., a Leichtenstein corporation. Id. at 834-
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ment of 698. After inquiring into circumstances, conduct, and mo-
tives, the Surrogate determined that the agreements were drastically
deficient from the estate's point of view, ' that the two executors,
motivated by personal gain," 9 had acted in bad faith,120 and that Marl-
35, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 932. Both corporations were part of a "maze of 21 legal entities,"
id. at 859, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 953, controlled by Francis K. Lloyd. Id. at 834, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 932. The court concluded that because of disregard of corporate entities
and of common financial operation, the organization should be treated as a single
entity indistinguishable from the beneficial interests and control that rested in Lloyd
alorne. Id. at 859, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 954. For the sake of simplicity, these two corpora-
tions will be referred to in this Note as Marlborough.
118. Id. at 848-55, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 944-50. The 100 paintings were sold for
$1,800,000 payable over 12 years without interest. The Surrogate, because of the
payment terms, discounted the per painting price to $12,000. This compared quite
unfavorably with the average of more than $80,000 per painting received by Marl-
borough on resale during 1970. Id. at 850, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 946. The consignment
agreement ran for 12 years, used prices from the appraisals obtained for estate tax
purposes as minimums, and granted Marlborough a 50% commission. The Surrogate
found that the consignment period was unreasonably long, id. at 850-51, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 946, the minimum price provision was inadequate as it placed the execu-
tors in the unreasonable position of urging a low estate tax valuation and then
agreeing to hold Marlborough only to performance based upon it, id., 379 N.Y.S. 2d
at 946, and the commission should have been in the 20% to 33 1/2% range because
an inter vivos consignment by Rothko allowed for a 10% commission, and consign-
ments by estates of somewhat comparable artists had provided for 25% to 30% com-
missions. Id. at 852-53, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 948-49.
119. Id. at 837-47, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 935-42. Bernard Reis wvas a director of Marl-
borough and a collector and seller of art in his own right. id. at 84243, 379
N.Y.S.2d at 939. The Surrogate inferred that Reis sought to continue his prestigous
status in the art world by currying favor with Lloyd and Marlborough. Through the
latter he had sold some of his own and his family's collection for "substantial
sums . - . before, during and after the critical period of these estate negotiations."
Id. at 843, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 939. Reis had ostensibly disqualified himself from the
negotiations, but reserved the right to disapprove or ratify the agreements. This
neither absolved his conflict nor allowed him to serve the estate as he was duty
bound to do. Id. at 842, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 938; see Stewart v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 3S
N.J.L. 505, 523 (Ct. Err. & App. 1875); Marsh, supra note 5, at 37. Indeed, subse-
quent to execution of the agreements, Reis, alone and without the knowledge of his
co-executors, amended the consignment agreement in a way deleterious to the
estate. 84 Misc. 2d at 851, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 947. Theodoras Stamos, another execu-
tor, was termed a "not-too-successful artist." Id. at 845, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 941. During
the pendency of the negotiations, Marlborough purchased a Stamos painting from a
third party. The Surrogate discredited Stamos' denial of any notice of the purchase
and concluded that the possibility of further sales and eventual representation by
Marlborough prevented Stamos from negotiating with the rigorous loyalty due the
estate. Id., 379 N.Y.S.2d at 941. Indeed, on January 1, 1971, Marlborough became
his exclusive dealer agent on terms more advantageous to him than those in the
estate agreements. Id. at 844, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 940.
120. The Surrogate discovered a "'curious atmosphere involving absence of hard
bargaining, arms-length negotiations, deliberate consideration and the presence of
improvidence and waste verging upon gross negligence on the part of all the execu-
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borough had notice of the breach. 12' The third executor had no con-
flict of interest, but was found to have been negligent.'2 At the time
of suit, a total of 140 paintings had been sold by Marlborough to third
parties in bona fide transactions."z The Surrogate voided the two
agreements "A and directed the return to the estate of the 658 paint-
ings still held by Marlborough.12 The issue was narrowed to
"whether the recovery [for the sold paintings] should be the actual
value ... at the time of the sales by Marlborough, or their present
value including any appreciation in their value." 12 The Surrogate
held the two bad faith executors and Marlborough jointly and sever-
ally liable for the present value and the negligent executor liable for
the value on the dates of sale.'2
The statement of the issue was correct. Because the duty of loyalty
was breached, the agreements were voidable and, therefore,
irrelevant to the issue of damages.2' The property was not held free
of trust because Marlborough had notice of the breach.'- The bene-
ficiaries had the right to demand restoration of the paintings not yet
sold and could compel payment into the estate of any profits made on
paintings sold to bona fide purchasers for adequate consideration.'
The beneficiaries could also compel payment by Marlborough of the
value at the time of the suit of the paintings that had been sold.'
tors as well as breach of duty of disinterested loyalty on the part of. . . Reis
and ... Stamos." Id. at 855, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 950. The Court of Appeals labeled the
conduct "manifestly wrongful and indeed shocking." 43 N.Y.2d at 314, 372 N.E.2d at
293, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 451.
121. 84 Misc. 2d at 860, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 954.
122. Id. at 846, 879, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 941-42, 971.
123. Id. at 873, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
124. Id. at 858, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
125. Id. at 883, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 974.
126. Id. at 873, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 966.
127. Id. at 879, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
128. The Surrogate rejected the contention that the measure of damages was the
fair value of the paintings as of the date of the agreements. Id. at 873, 379 N.Y.S.2d
at 966. The two dissenting judges in the Appellate Division would have measured
damages according to the reasonable value of the paintings as of the date of the
agreements. 56 A.D.2d at 507, 509, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77, 878 (Capozzoli &
Nunez, JJ., dissenting in part). Such an award would not have been the proper
remedy under existing rules and would not have adequately compensated the benefi-
ciaries. See notes 137-43 infra and accompanying text. A third judge concurred "in
the basic conclusion" while expressing "reservations with respect to various factors to
be considered in the calculation of damages." 56 A.D.2d at 505-06, 392 N.Y.S.2d at
876 (Kupferman, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Kupferman's interest was
in expediting the appeal. His use of the word "calculation" appears to mean that he
agreed with the theory of the measure of damages used by the Surrogate.
129. See notes 75-81 supra and accompanying text.
130. See United States v. Dunn, 268 U.S. 121, 133 (1925); notes 75-81 supra and
accompanying text.
131. See notes 79-81 supra and accompanying text.
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The problem created by Rothko is whether the award of apprecia-
tion damages was compensatory or punitive.' In affirming the
Surrogate's decision, the Court of Appeals held that the award was
compensatory." Reliance was placed on the policy supporting such
an award when the duty to retain is breached.13' The executors,
however, had the power to sell; thus, no duty to retain arose.' m
Although the Surrogate had noted the general rule that "beneficiaries
are entitled to be put in the position which they would have occupied
if no breach of duty had been committed," '1 the award of apprecia-
tion damages was not necessary to achieve this end.
The beneficiaries had a right to properly executed sales, but no
protectable interest in the appreciation of the paintings after the sales
132. This problem divided the justices of the Appellate Division. Stating that it
was adopting the Surrogate's basis for the award of appreciation damages, the major-
ity held the award to be compensatory. 56 A.D.2d at 502, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 873. One
dissenting justice believed the award unnecessary to compensate the beneficiaries
and labeled it punitive. Id. at 506, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 876 (Capozzoli, J., dissenting in
part). The second dissenting justice asserted that the Surrogate had "expressly
disavow[ed] petitioners' entitlement to punitive damages," but had awarded them in
the guise of appreciation damages. Id. at 509, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 878 (Nunez, J., dis-
senting in part). It is noteworthy that nowhere in his opinion does the Surrogate
disavow punitive measures. Both dissenting justices would have awarded damages
based on the fair value of the paintings on the date of the original agreements. Id. at
507, 509, 392 N.Y.S.2d at 876-77, 878 (Capozzoli & Nunez, JJ., dissenting in part);
see Wellman, supra note 2, at 102-03. See generally, Lipsig, A Recent Trend,
N.Y.L.J., April 24, 1980, at 1, col. 1.
133. 43 N.Y.2d at 322, 372 N.E.2d at 298, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 456.
134. Id. at 321-22, 372 N.E.2d at 297-98, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 456. Using § 208 as a
starting point, the court quoted Scott § 208.3 and Restatement § 205, Comment d,
which indicate that when the trustee with a power of sale commits only the breach of
selling for too little, appreciation damages are not appropriate. The court suggested,
therefore, that when "the breach consists of some misfeasance, other than solely for
selling 'for too low a price'. .. , appreciation damages may be appropriate." Id. at
321, 372 N.E.2d at 297, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 455. A serious breach of the duty of loyalty,
it concluded, was such misfeasance. The conclusion is correct. Appreciation damages
are appropriate when necessary to compensate the beneficiary for loss resulting from
a breach of the duty of loyalty. The problem is that neither of the quoted passages or
treatises support the conclusion, except for the then unsupported statement by Scott
in § 206. See note 67 supra and accompanying text. Interpreting the authority to
suggest that "some misfeasance" in addition to selling for too little may make appre-
ciation damages appropriate resurrects the fiction that improper exercise of a power
of sale creates a duty to retain. See notes 100-06 supra and accompanying text. In
addition, the Surrogate had cited Scott §§ 206 and 208.3 in his discussion of com-
pensatory awards and appreciation damages. 84 Misc. 2d at 873-74, 379 N.Y.S.2d at
966. That he found it necessary to justify the award on the basis of deterrence indi-
cates that he could not support the second conclusion reached by the Court of
Appeals that the award of appreciation damages in this case was necessary to com-
pensate the beneficiaries.
135. 84 Misc. 2d at 874, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 966; see notes 100-07 supra and accom-
panying text.
136. 84 Misc. 2d at 872, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 965.
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by Marlborough. Although the decision to consign and sell the paint-
ings was valid, the manner in which this decision was executed was
not.13 In the best of all possible worlds, all the paintings would have
been consigned on agreeable terms, under adequate controls for sale
at appropriate times. The purpose of a consignment to a professional
dealer is the skillful execution of sales that obtains the best price the
market will allow. Once Marlborough had purchased the 100 paint-
ings, its profit motive would also lead to this result. 3 8 When the
agreements were voided, the position of the estate became equivalent
to a consignor as to these paintings. 9 The beneficiaries, therefore,
would have been fully compensated by recovery of the profits that
were or should have been made by Marlborough. A similar assump-
tion regarding the sales of paintings originally consigned by the ex-
ecutors, if under adequate controls, is reasonable.
Marlborough had, however, made some bulk sales at discount
prices. "' The Surrogate, therefore, determined the actual value of
some of the paintings on or about the time of sale and accepted the
remaining sale values as bona fide."' These findings were necessary
to determine the liability of the negligent executor.' An award so
measured represented a complete compensatory remedy.' The
Surrogate justified the award of appreciation damages against the
other two executors as a deterrent to bad faith conduct by
fiduciaries. "
137. See note 120 supra.
138. 84 Misc. 2d at 860-61, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 955. The Surrogate noted Marl-
borough's efforts "in creating a market ... at higher prices, far higher than date of
death values." Id. at 861, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 955.
139. See id. at 879-80, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 972-73.
140. Id. at 871-72, 879, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 964-65, 972-73. According to Lloyd, the
sales were induced by the need to raise money for the defense of the litigation. id.
at 871, 882, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 964, 974.
141. Id. at 879-83, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 971-75. The award of actual value rather than
proceeds from bulk sales was entirely appropriate. See Rippey v. Denver United
States Nat'l Bank, 273 F. Supp. 718, 734, 738-44 (D. Colo. 1967); Powers v. Black,
159 Pa. 153, 156-59, 28 A. 133, 134-35 (1893) (per curiam); Appreciation Damages,
supra note 15, at 395 n.34.
142. 84 Misc. 2d at 879, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 971.
143. The award is also in accord with the current Restatement remedies. Restate-
ment (Second) of Trusts § 206, Comment b, § 291 (1959); see pt. I supra.
144. 84 Misc. 2d at 877, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 969. Although such an award may be
justified in certain cases, it is questionable whether it was appropriate in this one.
Return to the estate of the total actual value of the paintings that were sold, thereby
denying Marlborough its 50% commission, may have been a sufficient penalty. Be-
cause of the extensive promotional and marketing effort, as well as storage and insur-
ance costs, such denial would have been expensive to Marlborough. See 84 Misc. 2d
at 852-53, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 947. The impact of the litigation on its reputation may
also have eroded its good will in the art world. Similarly, removal of the executors
and denial of their commissions, id. at 857, 379 N.Y.S.2d at 952, may have been
sufficiently repugnant and stigmatizing to penalize the executors. See Trustee
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C. The Good Faith Inquiry
The extent to which appreciation damages are necessary to com-
pensate the beneficiary depends on whether, but for the breach, the
property would have been retained. To resolve this issue, a court
must inquire into the circumstances of the sale. Three variables are
present in any sale: price, identity of purchaser, and timing.
Although the Restatement remedies for breach of the duty of loyalty
adequately consider the first two factors,' they are woefully inade-
quate regarding the third.'46
The trustee under consideration has the power of sale. The self-
dealing trustee's resale and the equivalent of self-dealing trustee's
original sale are, however, both induced by the breaching trustee's
own personal interest. The question arises, therefore, as to whether,
if the trustee were not so motivated by personal benefit, the sales
would have been made at the same time. " This is a question of fact
Accountability, supra note 2, at 142. The award of appreciation damages may indi-
cate, therefore, that the Surrogate was frustrated with the allocation of liability under
the Restatement rules. The executors would have been liable only for the difference
between the contract price and actual value of the transactions covered by the agree-
ments, or the gain they realized. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 206, Comment b
(1959); see notes 58, 69 supra and accompanying text. Marlborough, on the other
hand, would have been chargeable with the much greater amount represented by
the actual value on the dates of sale. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 291 (1959); see
notes 75-81 supra and accompanying text. Such frustration would be understandable
because the rules can lead to inequitable results. The paramount inequity occurs
when the beneficiary is not fully restored to the status quo ante or when the third
party is less culpable than the fiduciary. In Rothko, however, the beneficiaries would
have been fully compensated by a lesser award, and Marlborough %was as culpable as
the executors. Allowance of appreciation damages against the trustee by reconstruc-
tion of Comment b to section 206 would correctly allocate liability.
145. Restatement (Second) of Trusts §§ 170, 205 (1959). As to price, the benefici-
ary can always recover the difference between the sale price and the actual value on
that day. Id. § 205, Comment d; see note 49 supra and accompanying text. As to the
identity of the purchaser, the trustee is in breach if, motivated by other than the
beneficiary's interest, he sells to himself, Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 170,
Comment b (1959), to his spouse, id. § 170, Comment e, to a related third party,
id., to an unrelated third party with the understanding that the property be recon-
veyed to the trustee, id., to an unrelated third party to benefit that party, id. § 170,
Comment q, to a third party with notice of the breach, id. § 291, or to a bona fide
purchaser. Id. § 284.
146. Timing as a factor in a sale is a matter of prudence. Restatement (Second) of
Trusts § 227, Comment o (1959). Liability for an imprudent sale depends on all of
the circumstances that should have been considered by the trustee at the time of the
sale and is not to be governed by hindsight. Id. §§ 227, Comment o, 230, Comment
e. Because "the question of prudence is one dependent on the time and place of the
making of an investment," universal rules regarding the standard should not be
fashioned. III A. Scott, supra note 7, § 227, at 1808-09.
147. Marcus v. Otis, 168 F.2d 649, 657, modified and aff'd, 169 F.2d 148 (2d Cir.
1948); Upson v. Otis, 155 F.2d 606, 611 (2d Cir. 1946); McKim v. Hibbard, 142
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to be addressed in each case, before the beneficiary is forced to
affirm either sale. No general rule will suffice. As a first step, it is
necessary to inquire into why the sale was made. The second step is
to determine whether, but for the breach, the property would have
remained in the trust. Because the trustee has given rise to this un-
certainty, he should bear the burden of proof as to both of these
matters.' 8 If he fails in his proof, he should be chargeable with the
value at the time of the suit."' If good faith is established, the tim-
ing of the sale should not be in question. If there is evidence of a
mere error in judgment regarding the fair value at the time of either
sale, or if there has been appreciation between the two sales, the
beneficiary may charge the trustee with either the difference in value
at the time of the sale or the profits realized on the resale. In either
case, the honest trustee is not penalized." ' In the first instance, lie
is justifiably required to compensate the trust estate for his error. In
the second, he is restoring to the trust profit that he has actually
realized.
Damages assume a primary role in achieving deterrence."" Com-
pensatory damages for breach of trust and restitution of benefit in the
absence of a breach are sufficient deterrents to the "temptations" buf-
feting the honest trustee. Unavailability of appreciation damages for
bad faith breaches takes the sting out of the no further inquiry rule
with respect to dishonest trustees. Allowance of appreciation damages
against dishonest trustees after a full inquiry with stringent allocation
of burdens of proof will better deter those most susceptible to self-
interest and ensure full compensation of the beneficiary.
Mass. 422, 425-26, 8 N.E. 152, 154 (1886); cf. Dabney v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 196
F.2d 668 (2d Cir. 1952) (full inquiry into whether trustee in bankruptcy required
debtor to repay loan owed to trustee prior to insolvency because of knowledge of
impending solvency exonerated trustee). See also Appreciation Damages, supra note
15, at 395 nn.32 & 34.
148. The wrongdoer should bear the risk of the uncertainty created by his own
wrongdoing. Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946). In
Phelan v. Middle States Oil Corp., 220 F.2d 593 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.
929 (1955), the court stated that, in the instance of a conflict of interest, the burden
rested on the petitioner to show that the conflict actually affected the fudiciary's
conduct. Id. at 600-03. Once this burden is met, however, the fiduciary has the
burden to show no loss was suffered because of his conflict. Id. at 600. In self-dealing
cases, the trustee would immediately bear the burden because of the no further
inquiry rule. See Haggerty, supra note 3, at 28-29.
149. See Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 51-52 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 341 U.S.
920 (1951).
150. Trustee Accountability, supra note 2, at 142.
151. See In re Estate of Rothko, 84 Misc. 2d 830, 877, 379 N.Y.S.2d 923, 969
(Sur. Ct. 1975), modified and aff'd, 56 A.D.2d 499, 392 N.Y.S.2d 870, aff'd, 43
N.Y.2d 305, 372 N.E.2d 291, 401 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1977); Trustee Accountability, supra
note 2, at 142.
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CONCLUSION
Current day trusteeship is an onerous position. It requires a knowl-
edge of law, tax, and general business matters and an uncompromised
vigilance for pitfalls and traps. The trustee is now at risk to exercise
such prudence and diligence in the care and management of the trust
estate as prudent men employ in their own affairs. On such a rule is
grafted the duty to administer the trust estate solely in the interest of
the beneficiary. The two complement and overlap, but are quite dis-
tinct. The duty of loyalty is an absolute barrier, the prudent man rule
an objective standard. That courts are willing to investigate as nebu-
lous a standard as prudence indicates a confidence in subjecting the
conduct of a trustee to rigorous scrutiny while serving justice com-
petently. That courts would still fear an inquiry into the honor that
lies at the heart of the duty of loyalty because the quarry may prove
elusive is anomalous. Good faith is the threshold of honor and is no
more mercurial than prudence.
Barry L. Zins
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